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Abstract 
Since most NextGen Operational Improvements (OIs) have been implemented recently, there is no traditional safety statistics, such 
as the number of accidents and/or incidents available to perform their formal safety evaluations. In this paper we present a process 
of safety assessment using precursors that may lead to unsafe outcomes. We use the radar track data to estimate traffic separations 
before and after NextGen OI implementation at Memphis International Airport (MEM). The FAA implemented Phase 1of wake 
re-categorization (RECAT) separation standards at MEM in November 2012. We examine the counts of wake, proximity, and 
anomalous trajectory events for two 30-day samples of pre- and post-RECAT periods. While the paper focuses on the methodology 
and is not intended to provide a detailed safety evaluation of RECAT, the findings suggest that RECAT implementation did not 
adversely affect the air traffic safety.   
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1. Introduction 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is working towards the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) that will transform how the National Air Transportation System (NAS) operates to meet future traffic 
demand and enable efficiencies for users and service providers. Advances in navigation, communications, and traffic 
management provide emerging concepts that will solve existing and anticipated operational problems in the NAS. 
In managing the development of NextGen, the FAA is assessing initiatives and potential components of the future 
system. For proposed Operational Improvements (OIs) the assessments typically are conducted through modeling, 
simulation, and/or Subject Matter Expert (SME) surveys. For the OIs that have already been implemented there is also 
an opportunity to carry out assessments which are done by estimating safety metrics before and after the 
implementations. While operational benefit assessment is somewhat straightforward since the throughput, delays, fuel 
consumption, and other operational data are readily available, measuring the safety impact is more complicated. 
Measuring the number of accidents as an outcome variable does not adequately capture the true safety state of the 
system since it measures something that does not happen frequently over time. Since most of NextGen OIs, have been 
implemented fairly recently, adequate accident statistics may not exist. Also, reliance on SME opinion and voluntary 
reporting introduces subjectivity and self-selection bias. 
Proactive safety management approach is based on the early identification and mitigation of hazards before 
negative events occur. In other words, proactive approach identifies precursors that may lead to unsafe outcomes. For 
example, reductions in air traffic separations below required minimums can be considered as precursors to midair 
collisions, therefore, the analysis of proximity events before and after NextGen OI implementations can be used in 
safety assessment. 
In this paper we use the radar track data from the Offload Extractor of the Sector Design and Analysis Tool (SDAT) 
to estimate traffic separations and anomalous trajectory events, such as missed approaches, S-turns/360 degree turns 
close to outer marker, and holding patterns before and after NextGen OI implementation at Memphis International 
Airport (MEM). 
The FAA implemented Phase 1 of wake re-categorization (RECAT) separation standards at MEM in November 
2012. The new standard establishes six new wake categories based on an analysis of the sixty-one most common 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aircraft types operating in the busiest airports of the EU and US. 
Several studies have documented operational benefits of RECAT implementation at MEM, however, the safety impact 
was not yet addressed with the exceptions of voluntary reports by FedEx pilots.  
In this study we examine traffic separations and counts of anomalous events before and after the OI implementation. 
Our findings suggest that RECAT implementation at MEM did not adversely affect safety. However, this paper’s 
focus is more on the process of NextGen OI safety assessment than on the RECAT analysis results. The paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the System Safety Management Transformation Program 
(SSMT); Section 3 describes the FAA RECAT initiative; The process of risk assessment using safety precursors is 
presented in Section 4; Section 5 provides the results of the analysis; and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. System Safety Management Transformation Program 
In the evolving Air Transportation System (ATS), safety management transitions from a forensic approach that 
provides an indication that the system is not safe when accidents happen, to a proactive approach that is based on the 
early identification, assessment, and mitigation of any credible hazards before undesirable events occur (Pasquini and 
Pozzi, 2005). As the ATS is becoming more technologically and operationally complex, emerging risks are more 
difficult to understand. Also, quantitative assessment of risk is especially challenging when undesired events are 
extremely rare and the causal factors are numerous and difficult to quantify (Hadjimichael, 2009).  
To be able to meet future safety goals, the safety management process has to evolve with the ATS. Civil aviation 
authorities in the United States and Europe have launched several initiatives that attempt to address NextGen and 
SESAR safety needs and focus on the proactive approach to safety management. One of such initiatives within the 
FAA is the System Safety Management Transformation (SSMT) program that provides an integrated safety 
management approach and supports a proactive strategy for building increased safety into the ATS. SSMT is 
developing innovative safety monitoring and risk assessment methods, which can apply to both current and future 
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ATM operations including emerging OIs during the transformation to NextGen. SSMT covers the entire spectrum of 
the ATM processes from ground management at the airport, to traffic management while the aircraft is in flight, to 
the network/system level processes relating to the entire set of flight operations. 
The SSMT team has developed an Integrated Safety Assessment Model (ISAM) for analyzing the impact of 
NextGen OIs and emerging technologies on NAS safety. ISAM combines existing air transport safety models in a 
unified and scalable framework enabling the collection and analysis of precursor event data to improve the quality of 
safety modeling available to the aviation community. To compute and understand risk, ISAM models accident and 
incident scenarios through Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) (NASA, 2002). FTA is 
a top-down deductive failure analysis of an undesirable top-event (for example, an initiating event for Midair Collision 
is that aircraft are positioned on collision course). FTA represents the failure of the chosen top-event using Boolean 
logic to combine the various causes and faults that lead to the event. The lowest-level causes are Base Events (e.g., 
loss of communication) which may not be resolved further. The FTA Boolean logic describes the flow of precursor 
events (e.g., loss of separation) and their corresponding controls or barriers (e.g., ATC warning) from Base Events to 
the top initiating event. ESDs track the propagation of one or more undesirable states (initiating/pivotal events, or 
top-events from the fault trees) to either successful or unsuccessful End Events (e.g., aircraft continues flight or midair 
collision). 
ISAM can be used to assess how system risk is affected by implemented or proposed OIs. However, the 
corresponding Fault Tree probabilities should be quantified in order to measure the changes in the system safety. For 
proposed OIs, that are not yet implemented, modeling and simulation or SME opinion is typically used to quantify 
these probabilities. For already implemented OIs, the most obvious method is to compare safety metrics before and 
after the implementation. However, since most of the NextGen OIs have only been introduced recently, there is often 
insufficient accident or incident statistics to support this. Alternatively, instead of accidents and incidents, their 
precursors can be used to assess the changes in system safety. These precursors that have not yet become safety 
incidents or statistics can be derived from available operational data, such as radar tracks or ATC-pilot communication. 
In this paper we use traffic separations and anomalous trajectories estimated from the radar track data for MEM traffic 
before and after RECAT implementation as safety precursors.     
3. Wake Re-categorization  
As part of the NextGen Multiple Runway Operations focus area, it has been identified that for the efficiency of 
parallel runway operations, and in particular for cases where those runways are ‘closely spaced’, one of the potentially 
constraining issues is related to the potential impact of aircraft wake vortex on other aircraft which are operating 
nearby.  
Aircraft operating in the terminal area are subject to specific wake separation standards which are often larger than 
the Minimum Radar Separation (MRS) standards of 3 or 2.5 nm and are defined by the FAA and ICAO on a pair-wise 
basis1. The objective of these additional separation standards is to provide safe separations to aircraft that are 
approaching or departing the airport so that they do not risk encountering the wake of a preceding aircraft, which is 
potentially hazardous. Table 1 presents FAA wake separation standards, for different aircraft weight classes: Super 
(A380 and AN225 aircraft); Heavy (maximum certificated takeoff weight of 300,000 pounds or greater); Large 
(41,000 – 299,999 pounds maximum certificated takeoff weight); B757 (classified as a large, but with a special wake 
turbulence category); and Small (41,000 or less maximum certificated takeoff weight). 
  
 
 
1 The MRS is 3 NM when radar capabilities at a given location permit.  A reduced separation of 2.5 NM may be applied when the average 
runway occupancy time of landing aircraft is statistically proven, by means such as data collection and statistical analysis, not to exceed 50 seconds, 
braking action is reported as good, and the runway turnoff points are visible from the control tower. 
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Table 1. FAA Wake Separation Standards (nautical miles at the threshold). 
Leader/Follower Super Heavy B757 Large Small 
Super MRS 6 7 7 8 
Heavy MRS 4 5 5 6 
B757 MRS 4 4 4 5 
Large MRS MRS MRS MRS 4 
Small MRS MRS MRS MRS MRS 
 
As the understanding of wake vortices has improved over the last decade, many organizations have concluded that 
the weight-based wake separation minima remain somewhat conservative and that revised separation standards could 
be defined based more on the wake characteristics of the aircraft, rather than simply being aggregated by weight 
categories. FAA experts in wake turbulence and safety/risk analysis working in collaboration with partners 
DOT/Volpe National Transportation System Center, EUROCONTROL and the aviation industry determined that 
reduced separations between similar type aircraft is as safe, or safer than current standards and if applied can also lead 
to considerable increases efficiency and capacity though optimized runway usage. The wake re-categorization 
program, Phase 1 was approved by the FAA in 2012 and Memphis became the first US airport to utilize the new 
RECAT Phase 1 separation standards in Nov 2012. RECAT Phase 1 replaces the previous FAA/ICAO wake-
-separation categories, which were based on aircraft weight, with an enhanced set of separations based on the wake 
turbulence characteristics of different groups of aircraft to provide more optimal separations during approach and 
departure operations. Table 2 presents RECAT Phase 1 separation standards.  
Table 2. RECAT Phase 1 Separation Standards (nautical miles at the threshold). 
Leader/Follower A B C D E F 
A MRS 5 6 7 7 8 
B MRS 3 4 5 5 7 
C MRS MRS MRS 3.5 3.5 6 
D MRS MRS MRS MRS MRS 5 
E MRS MRS MRS MRS MRS 4 
F MRS MRS MRS MRS MRS MRS 
 
The new RECAT Phase 1 categories are labeled A to F, with Category A including very large aircraft such as the 
Airbus A380 and Category F including smaller planes such as the Embraer 120. Under RECAT Phase 1 several aircraft 
category pairings have been allocated reduced separations, but there are also some aircraft pairs with unchanged or 
increased separation minima.  
Since the introduction of RECAT phase 1 in Memphis, FAA has subsequently issued a new order allowing 
6 additional airports to adopt RECAT and NextGen plan to adopt RECAT across all of the main NAS airports by 
2017. RECAT Phase 2 will be an extension of RECAT Phase 1 with a static “pair-wise” regime, where each aircraft 
pair has its appropriate wake turbulence separation minima. In the longer term, NextGen are also considering RECAT 
Phase 3, which may support dynamic pair-wise wake separation minima taking into consideration actual aircraft 
weight and atmospheric/meteorological conditions.  
MEM was considered a suitable candidate for the initial implementation of RECAT as it is the hub for FedEx, 
which is the largest carrier at the airport. FedEx were keen to improve the capacity at the airport and identified RECAT 
as an opportunity to achieve that goal. FedEx has around 500 operations a day at Memphis and the majority of its fleet 
fall into category C which with RECAT is able to operate at reduced separations (from 4 nm previously to 2.5 nm 
MRS). As a result of RECAT, the FAA reports that many FedEx aircraft can now proceed directly from the gate to 
the runway, reducing taxi time on average by around three minutes per departure. The FAA also estimates that due to 
the new separation standards MEM’s capacity has increased by over 15% resulting in nine additional flights per hour. 
Also, lower fuel consumption and fewer emissions are added benefits of this newly gained efficiency. 
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With all of the benefits of RECAT, since implementation in 2012 no wake-related accidents were reported. 
However, to our knowledge, there were no formal safety studies conducted to assess the RECAT safety implications.   
4. The process of risk assessment 
To study the safety impact of the RECAT implementation at MEM we use the SSMT Safety Investigation Toolkit 
for Analysis and Reporting (SITAR) which processes the radar track data, analyzes flight trajectories and estimates 
traffic separations. Figure 1 presents SITAR processing diagram.  
Since RECAT operations were introduced at MEM in November 2012, we use 30 days of radar-track data from 
pre-RECAT period (April 2012) and 30 days of data from the post-RECAT period (April 2013). The source of the 
radar-track data is the National Offload Program (NOP) obtained from the Offload Extractor of the Sector Design and 
Analysis Tool (SDAT). The selection of time periods ensured that the weather patterns are similar in pre- and post-
-RECAT samples. Also, the post-RECAT analysis period is 5 months after RECAT implementation, which suggests 
that FedEx pilots and MEM ATC had enough time to get used to the new wake separation standards.  
 
Fig. 1. SITAR Processing Diagram. 
To support this analysis SITAR was enhanced to include Wake Proximity Event Indicators that recognize if the 
aircraft are in a leader-follower configuration and the separations are below the specified wake-separation minima. 
FAA/ICAO wake separation standards were used for April 2012 sample and RECAT wake separation standards were 
used for April 2013 sample. In addition, following metrics collected before and after RECAT implementation were 
analyzed: 
x Counts of Category A, B, C, and PE Loss of Separation (LoS) Events 
x Counts of missed approaches 
x Counts of S-turns and 360 degree turns 
x Counts of holdings 
x Counts of departures and arrivals 
Our definitions of Category A, B, C, and PE LoS events are consistent with the FAA Order 7210.56C that is 
presented in Table 3. Category A events are the most dangerous among four categories with 34% or less retained 
vertical or horizontal separation. Category PE events are the least dangerous among four categories. 
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Table 3. Separation Conformance Categorization. 
 Category 
A 
Category 
B 
Category 
C 
Category 
PE 
Vertical Separation Retained ≤ 34% >34% 
≤75% 
>75% 
≤90% 
>90% 
<100% 
Horizontal Separation Retained ≤34% >34% 
≤75% 
>75% 
≤90% 
>90% 
<100% 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates how the horizontal and vertical trajectory data were used to identify the anomalous events. Thus, 
the SITAR Anomaly Assessment Component consumes 4D flight trajectory data and analyzes the profile in order to 
automatically identify anomalies:  
x Aircraft holding – an aircraft is instructed to hold at a fixed altitude and performs a circuit in order to absorb 
a required amount of delay for arrival sequence. 
x S-turn or 360-turn – an aircraft performs an unexpected S-turn or 360 degree turn close to outer marker in order 
to maintain required separation. 
x Missed approach – an aircraft is on final approach descending for landing and then climbs again to execute 
another approach.  
All these events have distinctive flight profiles and can be identified by analyzing the combination of lateral and 
vertical trajectory data.    
 
  
  
Fig. 2. Anomaly identifications from Trajectory Data. 
In addition to the radar-track data we use the FAA Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) data to examine 
operational demand and capacity, actual takeoff and landing times, and weather conditions for each 15-minute period. 
Since traffic load and weather conditions may have contributed to metrics of interest, we partitioned the pre- and 
post-RECAT sample periods into four subsamples: Light traffic load – VFR; Heavy traffic load – VFR; Light traffic 
load – IFR; and Heavy traffic load – IFR.  
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5. Analysis results 
Fig. 3 presents the average hourly intraday traffic counts across the 30 sample days for MEM for April 2012 (pre-
-RECAT) and April 2013 (post-RECAT). The traffic counts are very similar for both periods suggesting that the 
results should not be influenced by different levels of traffic between periods.  
Fig. 3. Memphis Daily Traffic Loads for pre- and post-RECAT periods. 
5.1.  Aggregate analysis of proximity and wake events 
As presented in Fig. 4, the total number of LoS events in the post-RECAT period is marginally lower than in the 
pre-RECAT period for all category. Also, daily counts of proximity events presented in Fig. 5 suggest that RECAT 
implementation did not lead to reduced traffic separations. The counts of LoS events in the post-RECAT period do 
not exceed the counts of the pre-RECAT period for all categories and time periods. 
 
Fig. 4. Total number of proximity events by category for pre- and post-RECAT periods. 
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Fig. 5. Daily proximity events by category for pre- and post-RECAT periods. 
5.2. Proximity and wake events by traffic load and weather conditions 
As discussed in Section 4, to examine if the traffic load and weather conditions affect number of wake and 
proximity events, we partitioned the samples into four subsamples based on the level of traffic and VFR/IFR 
meteorological conditions. Table 4 summarizes the results: With the exception of Light traffic load – IFR, the number 
of LoS events is lower in the post-RECAT sample. In Light traffic – IFR subsample Category C, B, and PE event 
counts are marginally higher in the post-RECAT period. Similarly, wake event counts are lower for all subsamples 
except Heavy traffic load – IFR, where it seems that there were 5 more potential wake events in the post-RECAT 
period. 
Table 4. Proximity events by traffic load and weather conditions. 
Events W PE C B A 
Traffic Load/Weather  2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Light Traffic Load VFR 80 60 118 73 59 32 38 24 5 4 
Heavy Traffic Load VFR 10 3 5 1 6 2 0 1 0 0 
Light Traffic Load IFR 67 44 32 76 17 27 12 18 1 0 
Heavy Traffic Load IFR 4 9 3 3 1 6 1 1 0 0 
5.3. Statistical analysis 
While the aggregate analysis of wake and proximity events suggests that RECAT implementation did not produce 
safety concerns, aggregation may obscure the results. To avoid potential bias we conduct the Negative Binomial (NB) 
regression analysis with wake and proximity event, as well as anomaly counts as dependent variables. NB regression 
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models are widely used in safety research for accident count analyses when the data suggest the presence of over-
-dispersion (i.e., when the variance exceeds the mean) (Hall, 2000; Miauo, 1994). The NB regression model used in 
this study can be presented as follows: 
Assume Y is a discrete random variable describing the count of separation events. X is a vector of covariates that 
potentially affect the occurrence of such an event and β is a vector of regression parameters. 
,  (1) 
 
,    (2) where       
 
and the variance is                                     (3) 
 
and α≥0 (dispersion parameter). 
 
Specifically, the NB regression employed in this study contains the following variables: 
 
                                 (4) 
 
where: 
x SE is a separation event (W, Cat A, B, C, or PE), 
x Log(TrafficCount) is a Log of the count of daily of operations at MEM (arrival and departures), 
RECAT is a dummy variable that indicates that an observation belongs to a period after RECAT implementation 
(“1” for after RECAT period and “0” for before RECAT period), and b2 is the coefficient of interest; b1 is the 
coefficient of variable that controls for traffic density.   
 
The NB regression model parameter estimates are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Negative Binomial regression parameter estimates. 
 
W PE Cat C Cat B Cat A Holds 
Missed 
Approaches 
S-turns/360 
turns 
Constant -4.39** -3.73** -7.59** -1.83 -13.42 -10.67** -7.49 -9.99** 
Traffic Count 0.92** 0.82** 1.30** 0.36 1.79 1.46 1.04 1.55** 
RECAT -0.12 0.15 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.42 0.22 0.74** 
RR* N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.09 
(*) Relative Risk (RR) – change in the dependent variable in response to unit change in an independent variable; ܴܴ ൌ ݁௕, where b is 
a acorresponding coefficient. 
(**) Indicates statistical significance (5% or better). 
The coefficient of RECAT provides the difference of event count Logs. For example, for S-turns/360 turns (S/360), 
Log(S/360 with RECAT) – Log(S/360 without RECAT) = 0.74. Hence, Log(S/360 with RECAT/S/360 without 
RECAT) = 2.09, which means that in the post RECAT implementation environment S-turns and 360 turns close to 
outer marker are about twice more likely than in the pre RECAT implementation period. However, as indicated by 
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the non-significant coefficients of RECAT for Wake, Category A, B, C and PE events, the implementation of RECAT 
at MEM did not affect the likelihood of wake or proximity events. Also, the counts of anomalies with the exception 
of S-turns and 360 degree turns are not significantly different in the post RECAT implementation environment.  
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
The analysis presented in this paper focuses on the methodology of the safety assessment using safety precursors 
in a ‘before and after’ approach. This methodology allows the evaluation of implemented operational changes in the 
NAS from an air traffic safety perspective. While the presented analysis was not intended to provide a detailed safety 
evaluation of RECAT, the findings are encouraging: there were no significant changes in the number of wake and 
proximity events and anomalies between the pre and post RECAT periods. The only anomaly that seems to be more 
likely in the post RECAT environment is S and 360 degree turns. Future analyses for other US airports where RECAT 
will be introduced and which have different traffic mixes and operating conditions may provide more insights on this 
result and clarify if this result is airport and/or period-specific.   
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